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The brain is a context machine
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A thesis is presented that the basic operational principle of the brain is to process each input in relation to the 
context in which it occurs—in space and time. The brain has evolved such that it knows no better or more fundamen-
tal approach to computation but contextual comparisons. A brain without context would be a whole another system, 
with a mind nothing like that of a human.
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Henri Matisse, a famous French artist said the follow-
ing about the way he worked: “I don’t paint things. I only 
paint the difference between things.” Little has he known 
that, having a human brain, he could not have done much 
otherwise.
The thesis of the present article is that the default modus 
operandi of the brain is to process each input in relation to 
the context in which it occurs. Due to the very principles 
by which the nervous system is created, it has no other op-
tion but base its operations on contextual comparison. These 
comparisons are embedded so deeply into the function of 
our brains that without context, our perception would be-
come numb, our ability to think would cease, and our con-
sciousness would turn off.
Inputs to the brain are not represented in their abso-
lute values or categories. Instead, representations of inputs 
are made exclusively in relation to other inputs—past and 
present. 
These contextual comparisons operate both in time and 
in space, comparing the inputs either against the past or 
against other locations. By comparing rather than isolating, 
the brain works predominantly with discontinuities in the 
inputs, charging its computational power by the changes 
and differences in sensory activations. 
Receptors and neurons
The contextual nature of brain functioning can be detect-
ed already at the level processing of a single receptor cell. 
A receptor cell transforms the physical input—e.g., light, 
sound, temperature, mechanical force—into neural signals. 
While doing so, receptors observe the temporal context. The 
strength of a response to a given input will depend typically 
on the strengths of the preceding inputs. If the new input is 
considerably stronger than the past ones, the response will 
be vigorous. If this difference is small, so will be the re-
sponse. 
This is explained by the phenomenon of adaptation. If 
a cell is exposed to a constant high-intensity stimulus, the 
vigor of the response reduces. The cell adapts to the stimu-
lus. The strongest outputs are generated not necessarily by 
the stimuli of highest absolute amplitudes, but by those im-
posing largest changes to the previous inputs. 
Sensory cells are not the only ones that adapt. Neurons 
in the central nervous system adapt well too. An orientation 
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Figure 1. Contextual changes of neuronal synchrony in the phe-
nomenon of brightness induction. (A) The brightness of stimuli 
on the left and the right are physically identical. The only differ-
ence is the relative phase shift of the surround grating. Neverthe-
less, observes perceive stronger contrast in the centre grating on 
the right than on the left. This phenomenon is known as bright-
ness induction. (B) Hidden line: Changes in the relative perceived 
contrast as a function of the phase shift of surround. Solid line: 
Changes in the strength of synchrony between neurons in cat area 
17 whose receptive fields are covered by centre stimuli. Adapted 
from Biederlack et al. (2006). 
sensitive cell in the primary visual cortex will respond with 
high firing rates if a stimulus of a novel, not previously pre-
sented orientation is shown. In the same time, this cell will 
adapt, i.e. reduce the vigor of its response, to a repetitive 
presentation of one the same stimulus orientation. Among 
others, adaptation of sensory systems has been reported 
in vision (Hurley, 2002), audition (Jerger, 1957; Ylikoski 
& Lehtosalo, 1985), touch (Jones, Gettys, & Touchstone, 
1974), and olfaction (Dalton, 2000). 
Most dramatic is perhaps the adaptation of the response 
to a prolonged presentation of a stimulus. At the stimulus 
onset, a cortical cell will respond with high firing rate. How-
ever, as the stimulus remains unchanged, this vigorous re-
sponse ceases quickly, usually within less than 100 ms—as 
if the stimulus is interesting for only a short time period and 
only its change is relevant.
Interestingly, when the stimulus is removed, the cells in 
the primary visual cortex will respond vigorously again (i.e., 
off-response), with firing rates often higher than that to the 
initial appearance to the stimulus (Nikolić, Hausler, Singer, 
& Maass, 2009). This illustrates the significant extent to 
which the past context affects the responses to the present 
stimuli. Apparently, the past tells the brain how much the 
present matters.
The sensitivity to the context in space is implemented 
too in the elementary circuits of the brain. In retina, a gan-
glion cell is inhibited by the activation of other, neighbor-
ing ganglion cells—a process mediated through horizontal 
and amacrine cells (Masland, 2001). This phenomenon is 
referred to as lateral inhibition (Hartline, Wagner, & Ratliff, 
1956), and may be the most ubiquitous wiring principle of 
the nervous system over all sensory modalities. In cortex, 
lateral inhibition from the regions outside the receptive 
fields determines the responses to stimuli within the recep-
tive field (Knierim & van Essen, 1992). In the primary vis-
ual areas, these mechanisms may affect even the preferred 
line orientation of a neuron, which depends on the proper-
ties of the stimuli presented in the surrounding regions (Sil-
lito, Grieve, Jones, Cudeiro, & Davis, 1995).
One important perceptual function achieved through lat-
eral inhibition is our superb capability to detect the edges of 
the objects in a visual scene (O’Brien, 1958; Shapley & Tol-
hurst, 1973). Lateral inhibition may play a role in a number 
of other brain phenomena (Todorović, this issue). Hence, 
spatial context appears to be as general functioning princi-
ple of the brain as is the temporal context.
Vivid illustrations of the above mechanisms are made 
through perceptual illusions. In vision, popular are the illu-
sions affecting stimulus brightness (Agostini & Galmonte, 
2002; White, 1979) or color, illustrating how spatially sur-
rounding areas influence our percepts. Also, visual adapta-
tion is frequently illustrated by after images (see Albright 
& Stoner, 2002) for a review on contextual influences in 
visual processing). But less known are the illusions in other 
modalities. For example, a haptic illusion can be induced by 
rotating a piece of chalk between fingers. Due to differential 
adaptation, a continuous rotating object appears to become 
thinner in the centre of rotation—obtaining the feel of an 
hourglass (Jones, et al., 1974). Quickly adapting neurons are 
responsible also for the feeling of flutter on the skin when 
stimulated with vibrations (Romo, Hernandez, Zainos, & 
Salinas, 1998).
In my lab, we discovered that the spatial context does 
not affect only the firing rates of neurons in the primary vis-
ual areas but also their synchronization. Brightness of the 
stimulus can be induced through contextual changes and can 
be, in some cases, as we find, explained by the concomitant 
changes in the synchronization between neurons. A change 
in the phase between a centre and surround gratings in Fig-
ure 1a can affect the perceived contrast of the centre grating. 
This manipulation of the surround stimulus does not affect 
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Figure 2. Examples of stimuli used in serial visual search tasks. 
An X, among V’s is much easier to detect (A) than an inverted V 
(located in lower-left corner in B) among V’s. Such experiments 
lead to the proposal of feature binding theory and to understand-
ing the conditions under which the discontinuities in the visual 
field can lead to perceptual pop-out—i.e., to context-dependent 
processes that attract attention involuntarily and automatically to 
the novelties and irregularities in the visual field.
the firing rates of cortical neurons responding to the centre 
grating. Instead, the strength of synchronization between the 
neurons is adjusted in the brain; The highest perceived con-
trast is associated with most highly synchronized discharges 
of cortical neurons (Figure 1b; Biederlack, et al., 2006).
Adaptation and lateral inhibition are not the only brain 
mechanisms sensitive to context. Also, not all contextual in-
fluences take place at low levels of processing (Vladusich, 
Lucassen, & Cornelissen, 2006). Others mechanisms exist, 
and some operate also at higher levels of system complex-
ity. For example, those based on processing shades of gray 
(Agostini & Galmonte, 2002) are entirely context depend-
ent, and are physiologically poorly understood. Also, the 
simplest form of visual memory, sensory storage (aka iconic 
memory), does not store information about an image inde-
pendently of a previous one. Instead, sequentially presented 
images interact in a non-linear way in neuronal responses 
(Nikolić, et al., 2009) to produce perceptual effects of com-
petition and integration (Di Lollo, 1977, 1980)—which is 
a process that relies on mechanisms other than adaptation 
(Nikolić, et al., 2009).
In general, it appears that the basic circuitry of the brain 
is utterly incapable of maintaining the absolute information 
about the physical world (e.g., temperature, mechanical 
force, light intensity, etc…). Instead, the brain has no other 
source of information but that presented relative to the con-
text in which it emerged. Evidently, when a big brain gets 
wired, the result a massive context machine.
The system in global action
If the building blocks of the brain obey context, the same 
may be expected from the entire system when fully integrat-
ed with all its functions. Consciousness is of interest here, 
a phenomenon that embodies, arguably, a high level of the 
organization of a nervous system. 
Studies have shown that the dynamics of consciousness 
is heavily affected by the context. Similarly to the adapta-
tion of sensory cells, the contents of consciousness—i.e. the 
pieces of information that attempt to, or succeed receiving 
the focus of attention—depend on the history. Simply put, 
our brain prefers novelty. We are more likely to pay attention 
to novel than to familiar stimuli. This preference for new, 
which is a next of kin to adaptation, has been demonstrated 
empirically most clearly in the phenomenon known as inhi-
bition of return (Klein, 2000; Posner & Cohen, 1984).
In the spatial domain, the novel and unusual drives at-
tention and directs consciousness equally well. Most exten-
sively studied are the discontinuities in a visual field—i.e. 
unique sets of features, different from the remaining parts—, 
which induce perceptual pop-out, attract attention, and pos-
sibly give rise to the subjective experience of visual aware-
ness. Conditions that lead to perceptual pop-out can be stud-
ied in experiments with serial visual search (A. Treisman, 
1982; A. M. Treisman & Gelade, 1980)(see Figure 2).
Thus, the unusual and the new seem to account for a 
big part of what we perceive, process and memorize—lo-
cally and globally. Context is hence, a fundamental operat-
ing principle at all system levels. Our mind does not simply 
treat the input verbatim. Instead, the mind is “biased” by the 
past and by the neighboring regions. Context matters.
Where do then absolute categories come from?
A question then arises of absolute categories, which our 
brains can also work with. An absolute perception of stimu-
lus intensity requires effort (Robilotto & Zaidi, 2004) but 
cognitive operations seem to work with constancies at least 
as well as with relations. For example, although Mark can 
be tall or short, depending on the context—short when com-
pared to basketball player Magic but tall when compared to 
gymnast Merry—Mark measures always 175 cm from head 
to toe irrespectively in whose company.  
Our brains can obviously think in terms of meters, and 
thus in absolute categories for expressing the length of an 
object. How does a contextual hardware produce these ab-
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solute representations, which operate for example in work-
ing-memory (Brody, Romo, & Kepecs, 2003)? And do these 
aptitudes suggest principles of brain function other than 
contextual? 
I think that the answers are in the ability of the brain 
to conceptualize, i.e., to categorize the world. Categoriza-
tion is an important component of perception—e.g., Does a 
particular sound represent a predator or a prey?—and even 
more important for thinking. The ability to categorize is 
considered a high-level function. The regions of the brain 
responsible for the representation of concepts, located in in-
ferior and superior temporal cortex (Mummery, et al., 1999; 
Nobre, Allison, & McCarthy, 1994; Zahn, et al., 2007), lay 
at high levels of the information processing hierarchy. Ab-
solute categorization of length in meters is a form of cat-
egorization.
Importantly for the present discussion, conceptualization 
in absolute categories does not seem a hallmark of the ba-
sic circuitry of the brain. Instead, such functions have likely 
evolved, through evolution, on top of other mechanisms 
that, originally, were not able to categorize. The contextual 
brain has to go through a great deal of effort to establish an 
absolute category. Not all forms of nervous systems may be 
equally capable of doing so. Unlike the automatic, effort-
less and unavoidable detection of edges, formation of such 
advanced forms of concepts is hard work.
Absolute categorization may require involvement of 
functions located at a level of processing even higher than 
concepts, those responsible for implementing logic—a ca-
pability of clear thinking executed by hardware of fuzzy 
computing. At present, we do not know how this implemen-
tation happens. The mechanism responsible for logic and 
conceptualization are unknown. 
It would be a mistake to assume that the basic building 
blocks of the brain and thought obey the rules of logic. This 
mistake has been already made once when the research field 
of artificial intelligence has made a promise to bring von 
Neumann computers to the level of human intelligence—as 
it was assumed that that we think like computers and com-
puters think like us (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958). The 
promise failed downright (Lighthill, 1973). Computers 
cannot think or perceive like humans do. Cognitive neuro-
scientists should not repeat that mistake. The evidence ac-
cumulated meanwhile indicating that the hardware of the 
brain is a fuzzy, context-dependent system. Throughout the 
evolution, clear conceptual thinking is created only later and 
is built, in an unknown way, upon these rather blurry basics. 
In our heads, the shiny logical software works on mucky 
contextual hardware.
Why context?
I assert that the reason for the brain circuits being, by 
their nature, contextual is an evolutionary accident, perhaps 
serendipity. There is no great wisdom or plan in forces that 
drive evolution of organisms and their brains. Evolution 
“works” with whatever it has at hand. It builds on top of the 
existing. And so does the evolved brain. Hence, in an early 
stage of pre-nervous-system evolution, it may have hap-
pened so that cells implemented simple regulatory reflexes 
but had to adapt to inputs for some simple reason such as 
the quick depletion of resources. Then, in the next stage of 
evolution, when a bit more complex circuits were “imple-
mented”, no alternative existed but to integrate this adapta-
tion of the cells as a part of whatever new design has been 
created. This way, the initial random choice of a regulatory 
mechanism kept being carried on through further evolution-
ary steps to ever more complex designs of the nervous sys-
tems—all the way to Homo sapiens. An initial disadvantage 
became a computational principle. A bug became a feature. 
The implementation of consciousness, especially the 
component of its subjective experiences (i.e. the qualia), is 
a mystery to modern neuroscience. These phenomena seem 
unexplainable. My hunch is that the problem lays in our the-
ories being inspired too strongly by computer technologies. 
Consciousness may be much less of a theoretical problem 
if the brain theories, e.g. those of vision, immerse consider-
ably deeper into contextual considerations of the perceptual 
principles than is the case today. By doing so, the discipline 
should abandon computer metaphors. 
A good example is feature detection. Today’s theories 
assume that neurons in early visual cortex detect elementary 
features of the presented visual objects (Hubel & Wiesel, 
1962). The problem is that feature detection is a tribute to 
an absolute category; Features are supposed to belong to ob-
jects independently of the surroundings. 
The function of a neuron in V1 may be a bit different 
than assumed by the feature-detection theory. As theorists, 
we may do better if, instead, we consider orientation se-
lectivity of a cortical neuron as responding to contextual 
(ir)regularities in the visual field, leaving the perceptual 
processes associated with elementary visual features to 
higher brain areas—possibly to the interaction between 
those involved in categorization, such as the temporal lobe 
(Mummery, et al., 1999; Nobre, et al., 1994; Zahn, et al., 
2007) and those guiding our attention, such as the parietal 
lobe (Colby & Goldberg, 1999; Farah, Wong, Monheit, & 
Morrow, 1989). This may relief the explanatory burden 
imposed on the early processing stages by the perception 
theories and may, in the same time, open explanatory doors 
for understanding the mechanics of subjective visual experi-
ences—i.e., the qualia. Such fundamental changes in theo-
retical principles may be slow and painful, but may also pay 
off.
Possibly, the brain computations, unlike our theories of 
those computations, are so deeply dependent on the con-
text that, without it, no candle of awareness can light up. 
The brain may be actively engaging mechanisms to seek or 
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induce changes and novelty, especially in the environment 
that is poor in delivering such changes on its own. The eye 
movements during a fixation may be an example of such an 
active quest for change. Our eyes, when healthy, make mi-
cro-movement with a frequency of 30–100 Hz and of mini-
ature amplitude, which seem to play an essential function in 
enabling visual perception. If these movements are abolished 
(actually their effects are abolished through innovative optic 
devices), our perception of the world fades away (Martinez-
Conde, Macknik, & Hubel, 2004). If the surrounding world 
does not change, the brain makes it change. A constancy of 
the input seems to bring the perceptual fire to a still. The 
dynamics of change seems to keep marry-go-round. 
By all means, this conclusion extends to phenomena oth-
er than adaptation of sensory inputs. Without the sensitivity 
to changes in time and space, we may not only reduce the 
contents of our awareness; The awareness may completely 
switch off. 
Static representations and absolute values of the sur-
roundings may be, in principle, also possible to implement by 
biological systems. But apparently, such mechanisms would 
be the workings of some other brains, not those evolved on 
the planet earth. Perhaps, these static brains would produce 
minds of “dry” thought and “dark” perception, uncharacter-
istic of human brain—but perhaps attributable to the artifi-
cial silicon ones sitting on the tables in our offices.
In visual arts, if the outlines of an object—i.e., the lines 
of demarcation—are put on the paper or canvas, our brain 
has enough to work with to perceive meaningful objects. 
Henri Matisse, being human, had the perceptual apparatus 
tuned for detecting and working with differences between 
objects, and so did the audience who appreciated his crea-
tions. Whatever feature or detail of a scene the master 
wanted to emphasize, whatever visual message he wanted 
to convey, excerpting the distinction between the aspect of 
interest and everything else in the image was probably the 
best, if not the only way to create and enjoy a piece of art.  
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